Tony Blair is a Liar and a War Criminal
By Xymphora

Sunday, May 1, 2005, 4:14 a.m.

The B-liar timeline is fairly simple:

  1. From a letter from Gordon Logan to Reg Keys (the guy who's running against Blair!; see also here) dated April 29, 2005:

    All the discussion on the Iraq war is essentially a diversion. There is a secret clause in the Trident submarine treaty that was signed by Mrs Thatcher in 1983. The secret clause states that the British Prime Minister is required to go to war if he/she gets the order from the President of the United States. You will appreciate that this information explains a lot, notably why Blair has repeatedly gone to war, but only when required to by the Americans. It also explains why Blair is so different from his Labour predecessors, such as Harold Wilson, who refused to send our troops to Vietnam in 1968. The secret agreement was designed by Thatcher to secretly tie the hands of British Prime Ministers for many years to come. Without naming sources, I received this information from a British Army officer a couple of years ago.

  2. In March 2002, Blair received legal advice from the Foreign Office that an attack on Iraq was illegal under international law. The advice was drafted by the Foreign Office's deputy legal adviser, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned on the eve of war in protest at what she called a 'crime of aggression'.

  3. Blair met with Bush in Crawford April 2002 and received his marching orders — literally! — that Britain must support the American attack on Iraq.

  4. Blair chaired a war meeting with his inner circle in July 2002, in which it was planned to arrange a reason for war. From The Independent [link to Independent UK article broken]:

    ... the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, had warned that the case against Saddam was 'thin'. He suggested that the Iraqi dictator should be forced into a corner by demanding the return of the UN weapons inspectors: if he refused, or the inspectors found WMD, there would be good cause for war.

    From The Times:

    ... at the July meeting Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, said the case for war was 'thin' as 'Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran'.

    Straw suggested they should 'work up' an ultimatum about weapons inspectors that would 'help with the legal justification'. Blair is recorded as saying that 'it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors'.

    A separate secret briefing for the meeting said Britain and America had to 'create' conditions to justify a war.

    This trick was necessary as Elizabeth Wilmshurst's legal advice was presented to the meeting.

  5. Blair lied continually from April 2002 to the eve of the attack that the war was not inevitable (needless to say both Blair and Bush lied, as both had determined to attack Iraq in April 2002, but both consistently said the attack was not inevitable if Iraq complied with its obligations to the UN). The lies are particularly odious as the most recent revelations show that the British government was actively trying to guide Saddam into providing the rationale for war by rejecting the weapons inspectors.

  6. The March 2002 advice remains dangerous, to the extent that Blair specifically lied [link to Independent UK article broken] about it:

    Mr Blair was challenged on whether he had seen Foreign Office legal advice in a BBC interview with Jeremy Paxman on 20 April. He replied: 'No, I had the Attorney General's advice to guide me.' In fact, Mr Blair had seen the Foreign Office advice as early as 8 March 2002, in an annex to a secret Cabinet Office 'options paper'. That annex is published in The Independent on Sunday for the first time today.

    Asked to account for the discrepancy, a Downing Street spokesman said: 'The Prime Minister accepts his legal advice from the Attorney General, not from individual departments. We are not going to comment on any papers prepared for specific meetings.'

  7. In 2002 Goldsmith was informed by the most senior Foreign Office lawyers that war without a specific UN resolution would be illegal. He told them he was forbidden to give his view by Tony Blair's office, presumably because they didn't want to hear advice which could have stopped the attack. In autumn 2002 one cabinet minister challenged Blair on why the Government had not yet received formal advice from Goldsmith, and Blair responded: 'I'll ask him when I have to, and not before.' Around this time Goldsmith was telling friends that he believed the war was illegal and feared he might lose his job because he wasn't able to give Blair the right answer. He was unambiguous that an attack on Iraq would not be legal.

  8. As Philippe Sands explains, Blair must not have received any advice from Goldsmith that he didn't need a UN resolution, as Britain made Herculean efforts to get one during January and February 2003. It was only when such efforts failed that the advice needed to be reworked.

  9. Goldsmith was sent off to Washington for 'reeduction', and received a thorough woodshedding:

    On February 11 2003, Lord Goldsmith met with John Bellinger III, legal adviser to the White House's national security council. The meeting took place in the White House. An official told me later: 'I met with Mr Bellinger and he said: 'We had trouble with your attorney; we got him there eventually.''

    I put this to Mr Bellinger; he reflected and then told me: 'I do not recall making such a statement,' adding diplomatically, 'I doubt that an individual of Lord Goldsmith's eminence would adopt a legal argument based on pressure from the US government.'

  10. Bellinger had peeled off the idea that the attack was outright illegal, but there was still some fight left in Goldsmith. On March 7, 2003 Goldsmith sent a 13-page memo to Blair saying the war could be justified without another UN resolution, but that it could be open to legal challenges (which meant war crimes trials, especially as Britain is part of the International Court of Justice). In particular, there was an issue whether Britain could rely on UN resolution 678 concerning the first Gulf War, and it was up to the UN, not Britain and the United States, to determine whether Iraq had defied international calls to disarm. He thought a case for revival of the old UN resolution could be made without a further resolution but only if hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation could be demonstrated. He therefore recommended a further resolution authorising force. Blair's government was sufficiently concerned by this memo that it set up a team of lawyers to prepare for legal action in an international court. Blair recently released this memo under pressure.

  11. On March 13, Goldsmith met with Lord Falconer and Baroness Morgan, members of Blair's inner circle, who put huge pressure on him to declare that the attack was legal.

  12. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then chief of the defence staff, demanded an answer on whether the military could be charged with war crimes. On March 17, Goldsmith, having been put through the wringer in both Washington and London, delivered a clean 337-word statement without any of the qualifications of his March 7 or March 13 memos. Goldsmith did not write this statement. It was written by Lord Falconer and Baroness Morgan.

They say that politics, like sausage making, is something you don't want to know the details of, and this is a particularly good example. In this fiasco of lies, refusal to hear or admit to hearing information you don't want to hear, and convoluted methods of justifying a war that everyone knew was illegal, including manipulating Saddam into providing a reason for war and placing incredible pressure on Lord Goldmith, we can perceive a whiff of the atmosphere which also led to the murder of Dr. Kelly.

Bottom line:

Tony Blair is a liar and a war criminal.

Sunday, May 1, 2005, 11:59 p.m.

Blair's problem is that he always had a Foreign Office legal opinion dating from March 2002 that an attack on Iraq would be illegal under international law without another UN Security Council Resolution. All the machinations with Lord Goldsmith were an attempt to override this opinion, which stood squarely in the way of an attack. The original opinion was written by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned on the eve of the attack as a matter of principle (she had been with the Foreign Office since 1974!). Her resignation letter was released with one paragraph missing:

I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a second Security Council resolution to revive the authorisation given in SCR 678. I do not need to set out my reasoning; you are aware of it. [blanked out section]

I cannot in conscience go along with advice — within the Office or to the public or Parliament — which asserts the legitimacy of military action without such a resolution, particularly since an unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in circumstances which are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law.

I therefore need to leave the Office: my views on the legitimacy of the action in Iraq would not make it possible for me to continue my role as a Deputy Legal Adviser or my work more generally. For example in the context of the International Criminal Court, negotiations on the crime of aggression begin again this year. I am therefore discussing with Alan Charlton whether I may take approved early retirement. In case that is not possible this letter should be taken as constituting notice of my resignation.

I joined the Office in 1974. It has been a privilege to work here. I leave with very great sadness.

The Nuremberg Tribunal declared:

To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.

German leaders were hung for initiating a crime of aggression, the same crime that Elizabeth Wilmshurst called the attack on Iraq. When the poodle gets out of politics, they should start measuring his neck (but Tony has at least some of the angles covered). The missing, and highly embarrassing paragraph of Elizabeth Wilmshurst's letter, which the Blair government speciously said it withheld to protect the privacy of the advice given by the Attorney General (!), stated:

My views accord with the advice that has been given consistently in this Office (the foreign office legal team office) before and after the adoption of UN security council resolution 1441 and with what the Attorney General gave us to understand was his view prior to his letter of 7 March. (The view expressed in that letter has of course changed again into what is now the official line.)

In other words, Lord Goldsmith accepted the view of international law experts in the Foreign Office that the attack would be a 'war of aggression' without another UN Security Council Resolution just up to the point when it was more convenient for Blair that Goldsmith change his mind. It took two woodsheddings, the first by Bush Administration official John Bellinger III — after which Lord Goldsmith found his natural baritone voice had become a tenor — and then by Blair cronies Lord Falconer and Baroness Morgan — at which point Lord Goldsmith had become a full soprano — before Blair got the opinion he was looking for. Given what we know now, Elizabeth Wilmshurst should be knighted for her integrity in service to her country. Goldsmith deserves the same treatment as Blair.

Wednesday, May 4, 2005, 2:39 a.m.

A few more details on Blair's strategy of lies:

  1. From Paul O'Neill and Richard Clark, we know that Bush was planning a regime change in Iraq immediately after his inauguration (O'Neill said it was 'topic A' 10 days after the inauguration). The neocons needed to get a few preliminaries out of the way, including their Perle Harbor of September 11 and the training-wheels war in Afghanistan, before they could set up for a war on Iraq, but it was always inevitable. Apparently it was also always inevitable that Britain would participate (we don't know, and may never know, whether this is due to some secret treaty, or just globalist Blair following orders from the Powers That Be). It appears that British authorities were approached no later than March 2002 with their instructions to participate, and the Blair-Bush April 2002 meeting just sealed the deal. From the Guardian:

    That regime change was an objective of the prime minister appears clear from a document leaked last year. It records Sir David Manning, the prime minister's foreign policy adviser, writing to Mr Blair about a meeting with Condoleezza Rice, then President George Bush's national security adviser, on March 14 2002, a year before the war. Sir David reported: 'I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a parliament and a public opinion'.

    Another document leaked last year records Sir Christopher Meyer, British ambassador to the US at the time, as telling Sir David on March 18 2003, the eve of the invasion, about a meeting with the US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz. He said: "I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condi Rice. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option.

    Rice raised the issue in mid-March 2002, and the 'script' remained the same up to the time of the invasion. Manning's memo proves that Blair had talked to Rice before March 14, as Manning confirmed to Rice that Blair would not 'budge' in his support. The fact that the British were approached in March or earlier probably explains why a Foreign Office opinion on the matter was issued in March.

  2. A number of months passed, in which the Americans started to get ready for the political framework for the war. The Bush Administration PR masters don't like the summer as a time to sell anything, so the PR attack had to await the fall. Judith Miller composed fairy tales about aluminum tubes, a story which appeared on September 8, and was immediately picked up by Dick Cheney. This constituted the official American beginning of the lying basis for the war.

  3. While the Americans spent the spring and summer of 2002 building their set of lies, Blair was apparently instructed to begin the process of creating the British lies, and thus we see the July 2002 War Cabinet meeting. There are a couple of telling quotes from the minutes of this meeting (my emphasis in bold):

    C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.


    The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.

    Amazing stuff, absolutely confirming all the worst things said by those who opposed the war. After this meeting, it was decided to work on three prongs for building the political case:

    • try to manipulate Saddam into refusing the weapons inspectors;

    • build the factual case for war based on weapons of mass destruction; and

    • set Goldsmith to work on a legal opinion.

    The first didn't work as Saddam refused to fall for the trick and allowed the inspectors to do their jobs. The construction of the factual case started with the late-September release of the 'September dossier' (the 'dodgy dossier' came out in February 2003). Finally, Goldsmith started work on the opinion, but Blair, knowing that Goldsmith was still influenced by the Foreign Office opinion, didn't want to hear his formal advice until he was sure that it would be a rubber-stamp approval of the war he had signed on for in April 2002.

  4. In the February 2003 American woodshedding of Goldsmith, he met with no fewer than five Bush Administration lawyers: Alberto Gonzales, then Bush's chief legal adviser; William Taft IV, chief legal adviser to the then Secretary of State Colin Powell; Jim Haynes, chief legal adviser to Donald Rumsfeld; John Bellinger, chief legal adviser to Condoleezza Rice; and then U. S. Attorney General, John Ashcroft. Wow! No wonder he was walking funny when he came back to London. Despite all the free legal advice, he still wasn't able to deliver the clean legal opinion that Blair wanted and the British military insisted upon, which is why he was sent off to be worked over by Lord Falconer and Baroness Morgan (who were then kind enough to write his opinion for him).

  5. On BBC1's Breakfast with Frost, Blair said:

    The idea that we had decided definitively for military action at that stage is wrong, and disproved by the fact that several months later we went back to the UN to get a final resolution, and actually the conflict didn't begin until four months after that.

    Blair's logic only follows if, after failing to obtain the resolution, he called off British participation in the attack. In fact, it is clear from the pressure put on Goldsmith that the only reason Blair tried to get a resolution is that he feared that he couldn't budge Goldsmith from his reliance on the March 2002 Foreign Office opinion that the attack was illegal. The massive pressure put on Goldsmith was necessary because Blair wasn't going to get the UN resolution.

A Conservative victory as a result of Blair's lies would be a disaster for Britain, and it must be noted that the Conservatives were more in favor of war than was Labour (the Conservatives are simply idiots for turning down such a solid gold election issue). It would be nice, however, if the British electorate embarrasses Blair enough so that the Labour Party can finally do what it should have done before the election, and throw the lying poodle out on his ass.

Comment by Peter Meyer:  Unlike in some countries, in the UK the Prime Minister must be among those elected to parliament. Blair stood for re-election in the Borough of Sedgefield. If he had not been re-elected he would not have been able to continue as Prime Minister. On May 5th, 2005, the voters of Sedgefield had a golden opportunity to inform the world that the British people will not tolerate a Prime Minister who has disgraced himself by lying to them and by taking orders from the leader of a foreign government and who has disgraced Britain by taking it into an illegal, immoral and unjust war. They could have elected Reg Keys, whose son was sent to Iraq as a military policeman and who was killed by angry Iraqis in 2003 along with five of his colleagues. As it turned out, of 41,475 votes cast, Reg Keys received 4,252 (almost as many as the Conservative and Lib Dem candidates), whereas the lying poodle received 24,421. Thus nearly six times as many of the voters of Sedgefield voted for a person of no integrity as voted for a person who represented a call for moral accountability. By re-electing a warmonger and a war criminal as Prime Minister, a person who took Britain into war on the basis of lies, thus contributing to the death of over 100,000 Iraqis, the voters have given Blair the green light to repeat his actions in the event that the Americans and the Israelis attack Syria and Iran. Another victory for human stupidity.

Xymphora continues:

Saturday, May 7, 2005, 3:31 a.m.

The British people voted intelligently, rebuking Blair but avoiding the trap of falling again into the foul cesspool of Thatcherism.* Despite his contrite words, however, Blair won't leave unless he is pushed, and there is an extremely serious danger of his playing the poodle again for Bush. Bush's next war will be preceded by an atrocity, probably either an assassination of a senior American official or a 'terrorist' attack against American civilians or a large group of American soldiers. Just like September 11, this will be followed almost immediately by an FBI identification of the identities of the 'terrorists', who will all turn out to be intelligence agents of the next country on the Bush-Zionist list of victims of American aggression. Blair will claim that he has no choice but to send British troops to fight against this outrage, and the Iraq debacle will be repeated. This poodle-ing will destroy the Labour Party for generations, and doom the British people to the predations of the Conservatives. Unless the members of the Labour Party get off their sorry asses and get rid of Blair as quickly as is decently possible, they are dooming their country, not to mention their party. Most politicians will never have another job as good as the one they have as an elected politician, and if they leave Blair around for any length of time he will ensure that they never have a chance to be re-elected. Once he is out of power, the world can start to prepare for his war crimes trial.

*PM: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were the two greatest disasters to afflict Britain since the end of World War II.

Tony Blair's 'Good Faith' The Iraq War
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